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REPLY ARGUMENT 
The trial court in this case, erred in granting Zions First 
National Bank's ("Zions") Motion for Summary Judgment, by failing 
to follow the two-step analysis required by Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c). Rule 56(c) provides in the conjunctive that 
summary judgment can be granted only if (1) "there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact" and (2) "the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law." The record amply demonstrates 
that a reasonable jury could find that Gina Cook had a contract for 
compensation with Zions, which included the privilege of receiving 
accrued sick leave when requested, and that Zions breached that 
contract by repeatedly denying those requests. Therefore, because 
the trial court incorrectly decided this case as a matter of law, 
the summary judgment must be reversed under Rule 56(c) based on 
facts in dispute. 
I. Although Mrs. Cook Repeatedly Asked Zions for One Day off to 
Undergo a Diagnostic Procedure, She Was Not Required to and 
Did Not Ask Zions to "Make Medical Decisions." 
Zions argues that Mrs. Cook's contract claims fail as a matter 
of law because she did not "present sufficient evidence in specific 
factual form that is material to the question of whether she and 
Zions entered into an express or implied employment contract that 
. . . requires Zions1 supervisors to foresee the 'need1 of a 
medical appointment or procedure ." (Appellee's Brief 
l 
("Zions1 Brief") at 19 and 20.) Although Zions is correct that 
there is no evidence in the record that Mrs. Cook asked it to make 
medical decisions or to specifically foresee her actual medical 
needs at the time her contract was breached, it is incorrect in 
arguing that such evidence is an "essential element" of her prima 
facie contract claim.1 (Zions1 Brief at 19-20 and 22.) Asking 
Zions to make medical decisions was not part of Mrs. Cook's 
contractual obligation any more than it was Zions1 duty (or right) 
to make those decisions or to assess her need for a specific 
diagnostic procedure. 
It is undisputed that in early 1994, neither Mrs. Cook nor 
Zions could have known of her actual medical condition, i.e., that 
she had an aggressive malignant melanoma, (R. at 253; 310), nor 
could they have specifically foreseen her medical needs. That does 
not mean, however, that Zions bears no responsibility for its delay 
in allowing Mrs. Cook one day off for a needed diagnostic procedure 
which the facts show she repeatedly requested. Thus, this case 
should not have been decided as a matter of law, nor should it be 
1
 With respect to foreseeability, Zions confuses the elements 
of a contract with the law of damages. The foreseeable 
consequences of a contractual breach are determined when the 
contract is formed, not when the breach occurs. Berube v. Fashion 
Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1050 (Utah 1989). See the discussion 
regarding damages generally at 23-25 infra and more particularly as 
set forth in the Brief of the Appellant ("Mrs. Cook's Opening 
Brief") at 28-30. 
2 
reviewed under the correction of error standard suggested by Zions. 
(Zions' Brief at 1-3.) The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that 
reviewing courts should "accord no deference to the trial court's 
conclusion that the facts are not in dispute nor the court's legal 
conclusions based on those facts." Republic Groupf Inc. v. Won-
Door Corp, 883 P.2d 285, 288 (Utah App. 1994). The factual 
disputes, including Mrs. Cook's claim that Zions breached an 
employment agreement by denying her the right to use sick leave 
when she needed it, require that summary judgment be reversed. 
II. Zions1 Claim That it Had No Contract with Mrs. Cook and 
Therefore Had No Obligation to Allow Her Leave When Needed Is 
Inconsistent with the Facts in the Record Which Must Be Viewed 
and Construed Liberally in Her Favor. 
Zions has taken an absolute position that it has no employment 
contract of any kind with Mrs. Cook. Specifically, Richard 
Crandall, Zions1 Vice-president and Director of Human Resources, 
testified that Zions "does not enter into any individual employment 
agreements with its employees and did not do so with respect to 
Cook." (Zions Brief at 6; R. at 95). Zions' position, as stated 
by Mr. Crandall, is typical of the position often taken by 
employers in order to prevent employees from rebutting the 
presumption that their employment is at-will. In this case, 
however, Zions seeks to go much further by claiming that it has no 
contractual, i.e., no legally enforceable, obligation of any kind 
to its employees. Zions' effort to avoid every enforceable 
3 
obligation, including Mrs. Cook's right to receive bargained-for 
compensation, is both alarming and without precedent. The position 
asserted by Zions and the precedent it seeks simply go too far. 
As observed by the Utah Supreme Court and by this Court, an 
employment relationship is a bundle of privileges which represent 
the various rights and duties between an employer and employee.2 
In forming and in maintaining that relationship, the parties agree 
on which privileges each is to have. However, in every true 
employment relationship there is always present an agreement, 
whether express, implied, or both, that the employee will receive 
compensation and benefits for performing services. Once those 
services are rendered, the employer cannot avoid its duty to 
provide the bargained for compensation and benefits by claiming 
that it does not enter into any "employment agreements" with its 
employees.3 (Zions1 Brief at 6, R. at 95.) 
2
 Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co.
 f 844 P. 2d 303, 307 (Utah 
1992) ("At-will employment is a bundle of different privileges, any 
or all of which an employer can surrender through an oral 
agreement.") Accord DubQJg yt grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073, 1077 
(Utah App. 1994) . Similarly, an employer may surrender privileges 
by written agreement, by its representations, by a course of 
conduct, or, as claimed by Mrs. Cook, by a combination of all 
these. The fact that privileges have been surrendered "may arise 
from a variety of sources, including the conduct of the parties, 
announced personnel policies, practices of that particular trade or 
industry, or other circumstances . . . ." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044. 
3
 See also the discussion at 22-23 infra, regarding Zions1 
attempt to "disclaim" this fundamental part of Mrs. Cookfs contract 
and the discussion at 30-33 in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief. 
4 
A. Mrs. Cook's Employment Agreement Gave Her The Express 
Right to Involuntary Absences, i.e., Sick Leave. 
In reply to Zions1 Brief, Mrs. Cook submits that, for purposes 
of Zions' Motion for Summary Judgment, she established that she did 
in fact have an employment contract — at least to the extent that 
she bargained for compensation, which included the privilege to 
request and receive earned sick leave when needed.4 In May 1988, 
before she became employed, Mrs. Cook was promised by two 
representatives of the bank that after an initial ninety-day 
waiting period, she would automatically earn and be entitled to use 
paid sick leave as part of her compensation. (R. at 437.) Zions1 
employment offer and Mrs. Cook's acceptance of that offer were 
memorialized on July 28, 1988 in a written agreement signed by Mrs. 
Cook and Joyce Misdom, one of those representatives. (R. at 437-38 
and 441.) (See the "Employment Benefits Disclosure and Pay 
Agreement" (hereinafter "Employment Agreement") , attached as 
Addendum "B" to Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief.) It is undisputed that 
Zions employees earn sick leave as part of their compensation. (R. 
at 251-52; 332-33; 436; 439. ) 5 
4
 There has been no claim by Zions that Mrs. Cook had abused 
or somehow forfeited her right and privilege to earn and receive 
sick leave when she believed she needed it. As of January 1, 1994, 
she had accrued 249.76 unused hours. (R. at 336.) 
5
 For additional facts evidencing Mrs. Cook's compensation 
contract as it relates to sick leave in the context of the ongoing 
relationship of the parties, see Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 4-9. 
5 
Zions notes that the Employment Agreement entered into by Mrs. 
Cook and Ms. Misdom, the bank's Operations and Compliance Officer, 
does not state that earned sick leave can be taken when needed. 
(Zions1 Brief at 17.) That fact, however, does not mean that Mrs. 
Cook had no right to request and receive sick leave when needed, 
nor does it end the analysis. First, Mrs. Cook's right to 
"involuntary absence" or sick leave is expressly stated in the 
Employment Agreement which must be construed reasonably.6 "It is 
well settled that '[c]ontracts are to be construed in light of the 
reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the purpose 
and language of the contract.1" HCA Health Serv. v. St. Mark's 
Charitiesf 846 P. 2d 476, 481 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Nixon and 
Nixonr Inc. v. John New & Assocs.f 641 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1982)). 
The concept of sick leave which must be taken only when convenient 
for the employer, rather than when medically necessary, is not one 
reasonably expected by any employer or employee. 
Second, the promises made by Zions* representatives at the 
time Mrs. Cook entered into employment confirmed her right to use 
sick leave when needed. (R. at 437.) Zions clearly knew the 
importance of sick leave as it related to Mrs. Cook's health when 
6
 The phrase "Involuntary Absence" as used in the Employment 
Agreement, (R. at 441), is synonymous with the terms "sick leave", 
"sick days" and "short term leave". See inter alia R. at 326; 332-
33; 335-37; 344-45; 351-53. 
6 
it offered her employment. Ms. Misdom, who signed Mrs. Cook's 
Employment Agreement, testified as follows: 
Q. So, the bank's sick day or short leave of absence 
policy is designed, is it not, to be used by employees 
who need to schedule medical treatment? 
A. Yes. 
. . . 
Q. Okay. Is it your understanding that if an employee 
is not allowed time off for medical care that the 
employee['s] situation may become more serious? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Potentially life-threatening? 
MS. BAAR: Objection. Same objection. 
THE WITNESS: Potentially it could be. 
(R. at 471-72.) Ms. Misdom also testified that it is Zions' policy 
and practice to allow its employees time off for necessary medical 
attention, diagnosis and treatment before health problems become 
serious or life threatening. (R. at 471-72.) Moreover, although 
he claims that Zions enters into no employment agreements, Mr. 
Crandall testified that Zions provides sick leave in order to be 
"competitive" and to promote the health of its employees. (R. at 
325.) His statement reveals the importance of sick leave to Zions' 
employees and prospective employees and the purpose of this 
benefit. The ability and flexibility to take time off when needed 
is the essence of sick leave. This bargained-for privilege was a 
significant part of Mrs. Cook's compensation package and an 
7 
important inducement for her in accepting Zions1 offer. (R. at 
251-52; 305; 332-33; 437-39.) 
Finally, Zions1 claim that it has no obligation to allow 
earned sick leave "when needed" is in stark contrast with Zions1 
admission in its September 20, 1994 Newsbreak publication to its 
employees stating that "Zions policies provide employees with 
adequate time to seek needed medical treatment."7 (Zions1 Brief at 
15-16, 124; R. at 349.) (emphasis added). (A copy of the Newsbreak 
article is attached to Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief as Addendum "C".) 
Zions1 claim that it provides "adequate time to seek needed medical 
treatment" means that its employees should be allowed medical 
treatment when needed — otherwise, why claim to provide adequate 
time for needed treatment at all? Any other interpretation of 
Zions1 statement is as incongruous as Zions1 claim that it has no 
contractual obligation to provide the compensation and benefits 
promised to its employees for their services. 
B. Mrs. Cook's Express Employment Contract is Confirmed and 
Further Evidenced by an Implied-in-Fact Contract 
Regarding Her Privilege to Use Sick Leave. 
Although Mrs. Cook used sick leave for years in reliance on 
Zions1 promises to provide it, (R. at 251; 304-06; 308; 439), Zions 
argues that as a matter of law, Mrs. Cook could not have had an 
7
 It is undisputed that the admission in the Newsbreak article 
is an accurate statement of the bank's position, (R. at 348; 435), 
and "depicts [Zions1 policy] very well." (R. at 411.) 
8 
implied contract which included the benefit of sick leave because 
"Utah courts have never indicated an intention to extend the 
implied-in-fact employment contract exception to the at-will rule." 
(Zions' Brief at 18.) Specifically, at page 28 in its Brief, Zions 
quotes the following statement from Justice Zimmerman's concurring 
opinion in Berube regarding the need for caution in creating 
exceptions to the at-will doctrine: 
Because the law in this area is in a state of flux, and 
because the at-will doctrine has become well entrenched 
in our law and any change in it has the potential to 
affect the practices of almost every employer in Utah, we 
must proceed with care in recognizing exceptions to that 
doctrine. 
Berubef 771 P.2d at 1050. Zions1 reliance on Justice Zimmerman's 
at-will caution is misplaced. The issue here is not the exceptions 
to the at-will rule any more than it is the rule itself. In short, 
Zions1 position is that the only right in the bundle of privileges 
which can result in an implied contract relates to whether an 
employee is terminable at-will. The trial court erroneously agreed. 
Even though Mrs. Cook's claims are not based on the at-will rule, 
the trial court, misled by Zions' reliance on at-will cases, 
incorrectly concluded that there was no contract, and ruled that 
in this case, since there has been no discharge, there 
exists an even stronger reason to disallow an [sic] suit 
for Breach of Contract. The Plaintiff remains employed 
yet wishes to maintain her lawsuit for breach of contract 
while going to work every day and continuing to receive 
employee benefits and income. 
9 
(R. at 478.) (emphasis in original). Instead of viewing all of the 
facts in Mrs. Cook's favor,8 the trial court specifically noted 
that there had been 'ho discharge" and decided Mrs. Cook's 
contractual claims as a matter of law, thus committing reversible 
error under Rule 56(c). 
The California Supreme Court stated: 
[c]onceptually, there is no rational reason why an 
employer's policy that its employees will not be demoted 
except for good cause, like a policy restricting 
termination or providing for severance pay, cannot become 
an implied term of an employment contract. In each of 
these instances, an employer promises to confer a 
significant benefit on the employee, and it is a question 
of fact whether that promise was reasonably understood by 
the employee to create a contractual obligation. 
Scptt v, Pacific Gas and Elec. CQ^, 904 P.2d 834 (Ca. 1995) 
(holding employment contract restricting employer's ability to 
demote employee could be implied-in-fact). The Scott opinion, 
despite Zions' attempt to distinguish it, is consistent with the 
Utah Supreme Court's decision in Berube. The Scott court further 
stated: 
The principle that implied employment contract terms may 
arise from the employer's official and unofficial 
policies and practices is [long standing] and has not 
been confined to the area of wrongful termination. As 
8
 This case is not improper because of its unique facts as 
implied by the trial court. Rather, it has necessarily arisen 
because of the increasing trend among employers to offer incentives 
and bargained-for benefits while attempting, at the same time, to 
retroactively as well as prospectively "disclaim" their obligations 
to provide the same. See the disclaimer discussion at 22-23 infra. 
10 
the court stated in Chinn v. Ch-ina Nat. Aviation Corp. 
(1955) 138 Ca. App. 2d 98 . . . s 'Of late years the 
attitude of the courts (as well as of employers in 
general) is to consider regulations of the type which 
offer additional advantages to employees as being in 
effect offers of a unilateral contract which offer is 
accepted if the employee continues in the employment, and 
not as being mere offers of gifts.1 [] In Hepp v. 
ppckhead-California Co. (1978) 86 Cal. App. 3d 714, this 
reasoning was extended to policies regarding nonmonetary 
employment benefits. 
Scott 904 P.2d at 839 (internal citations omitted).9 Nothing in 
Berube nor its progeny requires that an implied contract provision 
relate only to the termination of employment. As noted in Berubef 
"employment contracts should be construed to give effect to the 
intent of the parties. An implied-in-fact promise is a judicial 
attempt to reach precisely that result." Beruber 111 P. 2d at 1044. 
Similarly in Barber v. SMH(US)f Inc.f 509 N.W.2d 791, 794 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1994), a case relied on by Zions, it was noted: 
In analyzing oral statements for contractual 
implications, a court must determine the meaning that 
reasonable person might have attached to the language. 
In order to determine whether there was mutual assent to 
a contract, the court applied an objective test, . . . 
looking to the expressed words of the parties and their 
visible acts. ..." (citations omitted). 
9
 Prior to the denial of Mrs. Cook's requests for time off, 
Zions had not unilaterally eliminated or significantly changed 
either her employment contract or its policy and practice of 
compensating employees with the privilege of earning and using sick 
leave. (R. at 250-51; 304.) Therefore, the "continued performance 
of [Mrs. Cook's] duties is adequate consideration for . . . [her] 
implied contract provision." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044. 
11 
Zions has cited no contrary authority holding that a term of the 
employment relationship can become an implied-in-fact contract only 
if it relates to termination issues. 
Zions also incorrectly argues that if the Employment Agreement 
created an express contract, "the provisions of that document alone 
would govern Cook's rights/' (Zions1 Brief at 25.) As authority 
for its position, Zions1 cites Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.f 618 
P. 2d 497 (Utah 1980) and Barber, 509 N.W.2d at 791. These cases 
simply hold that an express contract term cannot be overridden by 
an inconsistent implied-in-fact contract term regarding the same 
subject matter, and are therefore inapposite to the issue at hand. 
In this case, the Employment Agreement in no way contradicts any 
implied contract relating to Mrs. Cook's right to earn and use sick 
leave. The typical employment relationship consists of express and 
implied-in-fact agreements. As noted earlier, implied contractual 
terms may arise from many sources, including the parties' 
representations, conduct, practices in the trade or industry or 
other circumstances which "should be construed to give effect to 
the intent of the parties." Berubef 771 P.2d at 1044. The terms 
are those expressed in the parties' language or implied from their 
conduct. Davies v. Olsonr 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah App. 1987). 
Moreover, it should be noted that Zions' legal positions are 
contrary to its factual claims. For example, in addition to its 
12 
Newsbreak statement, Zions relies on the deposition testimony of 
Ms. Misdom that "during a conversation with Cook about the lump on 
her lip, she told Cook that 'if you need to go to the doctor, go to 
the doctor"" and that if you do, Ms. Kenney "'would not fire you. ,M 
(Zions1 Brief at 14-15 and Exhibit "A" therein.) Regardless of 
whether Ms. Kenney would have fired her, Zions now faults Mrs. Cook 
for not just leaving. (Zions1 Brief at 21-22 and 36-37.) If Mrs. 
Cook could have left work as Zions now claims, it must concede she 
had that right. To the extent that right is not expressly found in 
the Employment Agreement or Zions1 oral representations which 
expressly granted her sick leave, it must be an implied right based 
on the Employment Agreement, Zions1 representations, the parties1 
course of dealings, their acknowledged intentions regarding Mrs. 
Cook's right to use her sick leave, and the understood purpose of 
sick leave. Therefore, the issue becomes a factual dispute as to 
whether Mrs. Cook was prevented from exercising that right. 
The facts, admissions and all reasonable inferences therefrom 
demonstrate that implicit in Mrs. Cook's right to earn and accrue 
sick leave was the right to use it when needed. The trial court, 
ignoring these facts, which it should have viewed in the light most 
favorable to Mrs. Cook, improperly decided this case as a matter of 
law. The summary judgment must therefore be reversed because a 
reasonable jury could find that one of the privileges expressly 
13 
and/or implicitly given to Mrs. Cook as part of her agreed upon 
compensation was the contractual right to receive sick leave when 
needed, and that Zions breached that agreement. 
III. Zions1 Claim That it Reserved Discretion to Grant or Deny Sick 
Leave Must Be Viewed in Light of Its Current Claim That Mrs. 
Cook Should Have Scheduled The Surgery And Not Gone to Work. 
In its Brief, Zions argues that although employees earn sick 
leave automatically, it has no obligation to provide sick leave 
when needed. This position is based on Zions' claim that an 
employee's ability to receive sick leave is within the bank's sole 
"discretion." Mr. Crandall testified that Zions' policies "give 
management discretion to grant or deny employee requests for time 
off from work." (Zions' Brief at 13, 518; R. at 409-10.) For 
support, Zions also relies on its 1992 and 1994 employee handbooks 
which state that "[i]f it is absolutely impossible to schedule an 
appointment for personal matters (medical, dental, etc.) at any 
other time than during working hours, permission for absence must 
be obtained first from your supervisor." (Zions' Brief at 11 and 
12, 113; R. at 111 and 146.) (emphasis added). 
Although Mrs. Cook did not receive a copy of any employee 
handbook until April 8, 1994,10 (R. at 251; 306), she knew that 
absences which could be scheduled required Ms. Kenney's prior 
1
 For a discussion of the handbook and its "disclaimer", see 
Section V, infra and Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 30-33. 
14 
approval, (R. at 252; 309; 344-45; 471-72.) Mrs. Cook did all 
that she could by repeatedly asking for one day to undergo surgery 
before taking any scheduled time off.11 ( R. at 252-53; 309-10.) 
Zions progressively delayed Mrs. Cook from taking one day off 
through most of February, March, April, and May of 1994. She was 
not allowed to undergo the diagnostic procedure with Ms. Kenney's 
approval until May 20, 1994. (R. at 253.) 
Zions1 assertion that Mrs. Cook has not established "essential 
elements" of her contract because she did not just leave work, 
(Zions1 Brief at 19-20, 22), is misplaced for several reasons. 
First, leaving work against her manager's explicit instructions is 
On January 29, 1994, Mrs. Cook requested and received 
approval from Ms. Kenney for one hour off on February 1, 1994 to 
have the lump on her lip removed. (R. at 252; 309; 338-39; 362.) 
Mrs. Cook went to her doctor's appointment on February 1, 1994, but 
was told that the procedure would take a full day and would need to 
be done in a hospital. (R. at 252; 309). After returning to work, 
Mrs. Cook approached Ms. Kenney again and personally requested one 
day off for the in-hospital procedure. (R. at 252; 309.) That 
request and several other requests during the first week of 
February, 1994, and in the following months, were denied. It is 
also important to note that in a January, 1994 staff meeting, Ms. 
Kenney, (R. at 306; 330; 389) , stated that she did not want anyone 
to take time off during the next several months because of an 
increased workload in the department caused by the department's 
conversion to a new computer system, and Zions' acquisition of 
another bank. (R. at 252; 309; 355.) Because of the demands 
placed on her as a result of the conversion to the new computer 
system and the bank acquisition, Mrs. Cook was required to work 
extensive overtime in the first few months of 1994. (R. at 252; 
309.) Although short periods of time off were eventually allowed, 
(Zions' Brief at 13-14), Mrs. Cook's requests to schedule a full 
day off were denied for months. 
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not one of the elements of any express or implied contract, and 
therefore cannot be expected of a reasonable employee. Second, her 
contract required advance approval for missing work for a scheduled 
medical appointment. Finally, the fact that she did not just leave 
work may relate, at most, only to mitigation, a factual issue not 
before this Court.12 
Zions1 factual claim that Mrs. Cook could have scheduled and 
received treatment without approval, (Zions1 Brief at 14-15, 21-
23), must be considered in the light most favorable to Mrs. Cook. 
The facts must also be viewed in the context in which they actually 
occurred and not just in the revisionary manner in which Zions 
would now cast them in order to avoid responsibility. Thus, this 
Court should disregard Zions1 claim that Mrs. Cook was not required 
to obtain approval before scheduling time off, because in fact she 
was. Viewed in this light, the facts show that a jury could find 
that a contract exists, and that Ms. Kenney breached that contract 
by denying one day off for a medical procedure when it needed to be 
scheduled. 
The trial court improperly considered the issue of 
mitigation of damages even though it was not raised by Zions in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment and presents a question of fact (See 
the discussion in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 39-40.) 
Notwithstanding this error, Zions has followed the trial court's 
lead by arguing on appeal that Mrs. Cook failed to meet her "burden" 
by not having the surgery without prior approval. (Zions' Brief at 
19 and 20.) 
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Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, the fact that Ms. 
Kenney denies that Mrs. Cook's requests were made, (R. at 341; 390; 
433-34; 475; 546), and the fact that Mrs. Cook claims that her 
requests were denied, (R. at 252; 309-10), demonstrate the 
existence of disputed material facts. Zions, however, argues for 
the first time on appeal, that summary judgment should be affirmed 
because Mrs. Cook's fear of being terminated for disobeying her 
supervisor was "subjective." (Zions' Brief at 36-37.) In support 
of its "subjective fear" argument, Zions has attached to its Brief, 
as Exhibit "A", a page from Ms. Misdom's deposition. Zions relies 
on this testimony to establish that Ms. Misdom told Mrs. Cook that 
she would not be fired by Ms. Kenney if she scheduled the surgery 
without approval and then telephoned in sick. (Zions' Brief at 14 
and 15, and Exhibit "A" attached thereto.) Because Zions has 
attached this testimony to its Brief, this Court should also 
consider the testimony of Mrs. Cook in which she emphatically 
states why she feared for her job, and directly contradicts Ms. 
Misdom's testimony that she was told that she would not be fired. 
(Pages 107, 108 and 220 of Mrs. Cook's perpetuation deposition 
taken by stipulation on January 15-17, 1996 are attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A".)13 
13
 Mrs. Cook did not include testimony relating to Zions' 
subjective fear argument as part of the record because it did not 
become an issue until raised by the trial court and discussed at 
17 
As the result of Zions' conduct, in the early months of 1994, 
Mrs. Cook's bargained-for privilege to request and receive sick 
leave when needed came into conflict with her understanding that 
her employment would be terminated if she took a full day off 
without permission from Ms. Kenney who was repeatedly denying her 
requests. This placed Mrs. Cook in the dilemma of choosing between 
her job and the diagnostic test which, for all she could have 
known, would have shown that she was perfectly healthy. Mrs. 
Cook's fear that she would be terminated if she left work for the 
scheduled procedure against Ms. Kenney's instructions was justified 
and must be viewed in the light most favorable to her. 
IV. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exists Within the 
Parameters of All Contracts and Was Breached When Zions Denied 
Mrs. Cook Her Right to Use Sick Leave When Requested. 
Zions argues that because it has no employment agreement with 
Mrs. Cook and therefore no obligation regarding sick leave, its 
relationship with her is not subject to any implied covenant of 
good faith or fair dealing. (Zions' Brief at 46-47.) On the other 
hand, Zions also claims that it retained sole discretion to grant 
or deny requests for scheduled medical treatment. (Zions' Brief at 
11-13; R. at 111 and 146.) To the extent Zions properly retained 
length at oral argument. (See inter alia R. at 517-20, 533, 569 
and 585-88.) An appellate court, in its discretion, may decide 
a case on any point that is proper for its disposition, even if 
first raised in a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First National 
Bankr N.A.f 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 1980). 
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sole discretion (a claim which is at times inconsistent with other 
positions it has taken) ,14 Zions had a duty to exercise that 
discretion in good faith. In Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Ltd. 
v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, 889 P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1994), this 
Court stated that 
parties who retain express power or discretion under a 
contract can exercise that power or discretion in such a 
way as to breach the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. Our courts have determined that a party must 
exercise express rights awarded under a contract 
reasonably and in good faith. See Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
Inc. 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991) [and] Resource 
Management CQ. V. Weston Rapch and Livestock CQt, 706 
P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985) (additional citations 
omitted). 
Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 450. 
An employee's right to request sick leave and an employer's 
discretion, if any, in granting or denying the request present 
issues which may be difficult to fully address in contracts. In 
Olympus Hills, this Court noted such difficulties, observing that 
"contracting parties, hard as they may try, cannot reduce every 
understanding to a stated term . . . . Instances inevitably arise 
14
 For example, for purposes of this appeal, Zions' discretion 
in denying requests for sick leave, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Mrs. Cook, is limited (1) by its Newsbreak admission: 
"Zions policies provide employees with adequate time to seek needed 
medical treatment," (R. at 349); and (2) by its current claim that 
Mrs. Cook could have left work for a full day without prior 
approval. (Zions' Brief at 14-15; 21-23.) It should also be noted 
that Zions' discretion was necessarily rooted in a contractual 
relationship with Mrs. Cook, as demonstrated by the cases discussed 
in this section. 
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in which one party exercises discretion retained in a way that 
denies the other a reasonably expected benefit of the bargain." 
Olympus Hills, 889 P.2d at 450 (citation omitted). 
In such situations, both the employee and the employer must 
act reasonably. For example, if an employee abuses sick leave, the 
employee may jeopardize that privilege. Similarly, if an employer 
improperly withholds requested sick leave, it may breach an 
employment contract, as in this case. "The law of good faith and 
fair dealing, though inexact, attempts a remedy for such abuse." 
Olympus Hills 889 P.2d at 450. "Good faith performance [or] 
enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed 
common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of 
the other party." Olympus Hillsr 889 P.2d at 451 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 cmt. a (1979)). 
It is well settled in Utah that "[w]here a contract confers on 
one party a discretionary power affecting the rights and interests 
of the other party, that discretionary power cannot be exercised 
arbitrarily, unreasonably, unfairly or in bad faith." Olympus 
Hills 889 p.2d at 456. see also Resource Management, 706 p.2d at 
1037. Thus, the essence of a covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is objectively reasonable conduct. Olympus Hillsr 889 P.2d 
at 458 (citing In re Vryonisf 248 Cal. Rptr. 807, 812 (Cal. 1988)). 
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The trial court erroneously agreed with Zions' claim that this 
covenant does not exist in Utah in the employment context. (Zions' 
Brief at 44-46; R. at 479-480.) This conclusion is incorrect 
because "[i]t is fundamental that every contract includes a 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to dealings 
between the parties."15 Olympus Hills, 889 P. 2d at 450 n.l. 
Moreover, "the obligation of good faith is 'constructive' rather 
than 'implied' because the obligation is imposed by law and cannot 
be disclaimed." Olympus Hillsf 889 P.2d at 450 n.4, relying on 
Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.
 r 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 
1933). Accord Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch.r 701 P.2d 795, 801 n.4 
(Utah 1985) (holding duty to perform contract in good faith cannot, 
by definition, be waived by either party to agreement). 
Moreover, whether a party has breached the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing is generally a factual issue, not an issue 
subject to resolution as a matter of law. Western Farm Credit Bank 
v. Prattf 860 P.2d 376, 380 (Utah App. 1993). To claim that 
employees have the right to accrue sick leave, but not the right to 
use it when needed is contrary to common sense and the reasonably 
15
 This Court, in Dubois v, grand Central, 872 P.2d 1073 (Utah 
App. 1994), has already rejected the argument "that there is not an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in either at-will 
or other sorts of employment contracts." Dubois, 872 P.2d at 1078 
(emphasis added). The "implied covenant protects an employee from 
denial of rights under the contract . . . ." Dubois, 872 P.2d at 
1078-79. See also Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 33-37. 
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expected benefit of the bargain which Mrs. Cook negotiated with 
Zions. A jury question therefore exists as to whether Zions 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by 
exercising discretion in a way that vitiated the agreed common 
purpose of sick leave and Mrs. Cookfs justified expectations. 
V. Zions1 Attempted Disclaimer of the Obligation to Provide 
Bargained-for Compensation Nullifies the Essence of Employment 
Relationships and Must Be Rejected. 
In its effort to create a broad and dangerous precedent, Zions 
argues that even if it had a contract with Mrs. Cook which allowed 
her to earn and use paid sick days as needed, that obligation was 
disclaimed. (Zions1 Brief at 38-44.) Although the at-will nature 
of employment allows employers to prospectively change the terms of 
the employment relationship, or to terminate it altogether, no 
employer should be able to use a disclaimer to deny any form of 
earned compensation. Thus, Zions' disclaimer argument is 
fundamentally unfair because it would retroactively void that 
aspect of the employment relationship which requires agreed 
compensation for services rendered. 
The handbook which Mrs. Cook received on April 8, 1994, 
confirms the compensation agreement and practice Mrs. Cook had 
relied on for years. (R. at 251-52; 304-06; 308; 439.) Although 
Ms. Kenney initiated a written form for use by employees in her 
department when requesting leave, she testified that this system 
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merely allowed her to keep track of scheduled absences. (Zions1 
Brief at 13, fl9; R. at 415-16.) Otherwise, Zions has never 
changed the terms of Mrs. Cook's involuntary absence or sick leave 
agreement. (R. at 250-51; 304.) It is undisputed that Zions1 
employees continue to earn sick leave as part of their 
compensation, (R. at 325-26; 334-35; 344; 351-53), and that at the 
beginning of 1994, Mrs. Cook had accrued nearly 250 unused hours. 
(R. at 336-37.) No disclaimer could nullify that.16 
VI. Zions1 Refusal to Allow Mrs. Cook to Take One Day off Work 
When She Requested It Breached Her Employment Compensation 
Contract, Resulting in Damages. 
On appeal Zions continues to argue that, as a matter of law, 
there was no contract, but also, for the first time, attempts to 
move this Court away from that issue by arguing that even if there 
were a contract, it was not breached because Zions eventually 
provided Mrs. Cook her accrued sick leave. In order to determine 
the existence of a breach, it is crucial to understand what was 
bargained for. Mrs. Cook entered into her employment with Zions in 
part because of the flexibility offered by paid sick leave. What 
was agreed upon by the parties was the right to receive sick leave 
when needed. When Zions prevented Mrs. Cook from taking one day 
16
 It should be noted that a review of the handbook disclaimer, 
(R. at 106) , shows that what Zions is actually attempting to avoid 
is an employee's ability to rebut the at-will presumption, not an 
employee's right to receive compensation. See also the discussion 
regarding Zions' disclaimer in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 30-33. 
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off work through most of February, March, April, and May of 1994 in 
order to have the lump on her lip removed and biopsied, it breached 
her compensation agreement. As previously noted in Mrs. Cook's 
Opening Brief at 27, a breach of contract is nonperformance of a 
legal duty when due under a contract. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts at §235(2) (1981). Delaying an employee's right to 
receive sick leave when needed is the same as to denying it 
altogether. 
Moreover, the sick leave agreement was sufficiently definite 
and understood by the parties as evidenced by their many years of 
contractual performance. As long as the agreement is definite 
enough to allow a fact finder to determine whether one party has 
breached it and to award some kind of reasonable damages to the 
wronged party, the contract is not void for indefiniteness. Cook 
Assoc, Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P. 2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1983) (holding 
"reasonable level of certainty required to establish the amount of 
a loss is generally lower than that required to establish the fact 
or cause of a loss.") In this case, the contract for compensation 
between the parties is definite enough for the trier of fact to 
determine its terms, the existence of a breach, and an appropriate 
remedy.17 
17
 See also the discussion in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief at 23-
3 0 regarding damages and what was within the foreseeable 
contemplation of the parties. 
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Construing all facts and all inferences in favor of Mrs. Cook, 
there is ample evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the 
parties entered into a binding agreement concerning compensation 
which was breached, causing damages. Consequently, Zions was not 
entitled to summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in Mrs. Cook's Opening Brief and 
this Reply Brief, Mrs. Cook respectfully submits that the judgment 
granted in Zions1 favor must be overturned with this case remanded 
for a determination of factual issues. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 1996. 
HOOLjB^& KING, L . C . 
Urn 11 M ^ 
ROGER H./HOOLE 
PAUL M. KING 
HEATHER /E. MORRISON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant 
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Exhibit A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
GINA COOK# ) 
) Civil No. 940905799 CN 
Plaintiff, ) Judge David S. Young 
vs. ) Deposition of: 
) GINA C. COOK 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ) 
Defendant. ) 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 15th, 16th & 17th 
days of January 1996, the deposition of GINA C. COOK, 
produced as a witness herein at the instance of the 
plaintiff, in the above-entitled action now pending 
in the above-named court, was taken before Rashell 
Garcia, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 
9:40 a.m. on January 15th at the offices of Roger H. Hoole, 
4276 South Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 






Certified Shorthand Reporters 
1710 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 538-2333 
1 will. But, Gina, back in February, March and April of 1994, 
2 why didn't you just leave work no matter what and go have 
3 this thing checked to find out what it was? Why didn't you 
4 just walk out even if it meant you were going to get fired? 
5 A. Well, I had been told that it was a clogged 
6 mucous seal. I was — I hoped that's what it was, that's all 
7 it was. I had been told if I didn't take my paper in and 
8 didn't get it signed and wasn't up on par with this request 
9 for hours, I would be fired. 
10 Q. You were afraid of being fired? 
11 A. Yeah. I didn't want to be fired. I'd worked 
12 hard to get where I was at. 
13 Q. Why were you so concerned about being fired? 
14 A. Because when this form was handed out to us, it 
15 was very specifically told in a staff meeting that if it was 
16 not filled out and signed by Pam and by Gaylene and we took a 
17 day off or we left, we would be terminated. 
18 Q. Were you worried about — why were you worried 
19 about losing your job? 
20 A. Well, I still had a child at home. My youngest 
21 was still living at home. She'd had a baby. She didn't have 
22 any money to take care of it. I was helping her. My oldest 
23 daughter had had some problems with her little girl and she 
24 was staying with me. 
25 I was raising two grandchildren plus another 
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1 child. I was the sole support of my family. You know, you 
2 just don't go out and find a job every day. It's not just 
3 something that just happens along the way. You have to kind 
4 of protect yourself, protect your job. And I kept hanging on 
5 with everything I knew, the fact that all it was was a 
6 clogged mucous seal. 
7 Q. And you've indicated that you continued to ask 
8 for time off? 
9 A. I asked for time off, yes. I never quit asking 
10 for time off. I'm the type of person that takes pride in 
11 being healthy. I want to be alive. I want to live, I don't 
12 want to be sick. 
13 Q. You also indicated that you attempted to get a 
14 note from your doctor? 
15 A. Yes, I did. I didn't have an appointment and so 
16 I had called the nurse, and she couldn't get me in so I had 
17 — I had gone down there. And her name was Karen. And I 
18 said, "Karen, what did he say?" And she said, "He said it's 
19 not an emergency." I said, "I'm so scared, Karen, I just 
2 0 wish I could get somebody to listen to me." 
21 Q. Did you ever try to schedule the appointment on a 
22 Saturday? 
23 A. Yeah, I tried that too and they don't do 
24 surgeries on Saturdays unless it's an emergency, and he 


















surgery done to remove the lump from your lip; is that 
correct? 
A. I had a conversation with her and I do think that 
came up, yes. 
Q. And her title was compliance officer? 
A. I believe so. As far as I know, that's what it 
was. 
Q. And I think she testified that she was an officer 
of the bank when she had her deposition taken. Was that your 
understanding as well? 
A. I can't remember. It seems like something like 
that. 
Q. You testified that she said to you, "Make the 
appointment to have the surgery done and then phone in 
sick." And then you said to her, "But Gaylene will fire 





















And did she tell you after that, "Gaylene will 
you for doing that?" 
She couldn't tell me what Gaylene was going to 
But did she say that? 
No. 
Angie Mamales, do you remember her? 
I do. 
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